Photo by Weichu Wang.
Doctoral Researcher in Economics
Center for Mathematical Economics
Bielefeld University
I am a doctoral researcher in economics at the Center for Mathematical Economics at Bielefeld University. My research focuses on economic design, especially how ambiguity affects auctions, contracts, and related design problems.
Short abstract. We study first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders are uncertain about opponents’ value distributions and have smooth ambiguity preferences. Stronger ambiguity aversion raises bids toward the maxmin benchmark and can reverse standard revenue rankings between first- and second-price auctions, while bidder preferences depend on the form of ambiguity aversion.
Short abstract. We study ambiguous contracts in a finite moral-hazard model with an \(\alpha\)-MEU agent. For \(\alpha < 1\), consistency is not without loss of generality: inconsistent payment sets may strictly improve the principal’s payoff, so consistency becomes a substantive credibility restriction. Under consistency, we obtain sharp implementability thresholds, show that the single-outcome-payment characterization generally fails for \(\alpha \in (0,1)\), and prove that any consistent incentive-compatible ambiguous contract can be reduced to at most \(n-1\) payment functions.
